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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendanis-Appellant )
I

DAVID NELSON and LOY PEHRSON, et al,

Supreme Court Docket #35543-2008
(Custer County C a s e #CV 2005-91)

BIG LOST RIVER IRRIGATION DISTRICT;
Board of Directors, RICHARD REYNOLDS,
CHARLIE HUGGINS, KENT HARWOOD,
JOEL ANDERSON, M. MARX HINTZE,
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES,
a n d DAVID R. TUTHILL, JR., Director,
Defendants-CounterclaimantsCrossdefendants-Resmndents.
and
ROBERT WADDOUPS, et a!, JAY
PEARSON, et al,

F

Intervenors-CounterclaimantsCrossclaimants-Respondents.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR CUSTER COUNTY
HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLING, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of t h e Case.
Appellants, all 63 of them, are consumers of water that Respondent Big

Lost River Irrigation District (hereinafter "District") holds in trust for each of them,
based on a judicial apportionment in 1936. Each consumer was apportioned a
specific volume of water, as measured in the Mackay Dam. This water is
delivered from the Mackay Dam to the consumers' various headgates and
canals by transporting it down the natural channel of the Big Lost River. Many
stretches or "reaches" of the river have significant conveyance loss, or what is
referred to here as "shrink, as the river runs downstream more than 25 miles
from Mackay to Arco, with the percentage of shrink generally increasing further
downstream.
Appellants are referred to here as the Mackay Users to distinguish them
from the Intervenors, who are referred to as the Arco Users. The Mackay Users
divert water from the natural river channei above what is known as the Blaine
Diversion, a canal where the District historicaily diverted ali water from the river
channel.
The appeal of this declaratory judgment action arises from the fact that
the district court declared the District has discretion to charge conveyance loss

against the apportioned water of the Mackay Users, even for conveyance
losses that occur downstream from, and are not related to, the delivery of their
water.
Appellants maintain the district court erred because the District's power is
limited by both the 1936 decree apportioning water and by a 1994 Rule
implemented by IDWR prescribing that conveyance losses in the natural
channel be apportioned only to those whose water passes through a particular
stretch, or reach, of the river.
In sum, Appellants ask this Court to declare that the District's discretion to
distribute water is limited and circumscribed by the 1936 decree, by the I994
Rule, and by equity. In other words, it is an abuse of discretion to charge a
Mackay User's apportioned amount of water for conveyance loss occurring
near Arco. Yet, the District has attempted to do this under the appellation of
"universal shrink", as it did both in 1994,which led to the 1994 Rule, and again
beginning in 2005, which gave rise to the instant case.
Appellants respectfully submit the decisions below are based on an
erroneous understanding of the law, namely: (1) a misconception that the
District had a statutory discretion to ignore IDWR's Rules requiring an accounting
and application of conveyance loss by river reach; (2) a misconception that

the District has discretion to ignore and undercut the 1936 judicial decree,
which is res judicata, and which apportions the water "as measured in the
reservoir" to each tract of land; and, (3) a failure to understand "universal
shrink" is contrary to law because it takes a fixed, judicial apportionment of
water from one consumer and gives it to another'further downriver.'
II.

Course of Proceedings Below

The Mackay Users initiated this case against the District seeking to have
the court declare the River-by-Reach Rule applicable and have the universal
shrink scheme invalidated. The court initially granted a preliminary injunction
"

holding the Rule was clear and required conveyance losses to be allocated on
a reach-by-reach basis. R. p. 28-33. The Arco Users intervened and a series of
amended complaints followed, including to join IDWR as a party because its
Rules were involved. R. p. 74-93. The District counterclaimed for a declaration
that the universal shrink scheme was lawful and within the discretion of the
District. R. p.94-100.
Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. On November 17, 2006,
the court issued its Opinion, Decision, and Order on Defendant Big Lost River

1 The actuoi wroctice throuah which this is occom~lishedaowears lo be to charue, or deduct, from the consumer's
apportioned amount, an omount reflecting a portion of totdiconveyonce lossesin the entire iiver, instead of just the
wortion used lo aet water to the consumer's diversion from !he river. in other words. instead of charaina bv river
segment or reaches, as IDWR's rules require. Mockoy Users are charged based on oil losses in the entire length of the
river.
"

V

.

Irrigation Districf's Mofion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment. R. p. 145-158. The court held that IDWR's River-by-Reach
Rule (Rule 40.03) requires the watermaster to charge conveyance loss against
storage water to administer the natural flow in the River, but the District still has
unfettered discretion to manage conveyance loss amongst its consumers
under discretion allocated through ldaho Code §43-304. In short, the court
held that, while IDWR lhas authority under ldaho Code $42-603 to promulgate
rules regarding water in the natural channel, that the statute conflicted with the
discretion to distribute water among consumers given to the District by ldaho
Code 343-304. R. p. 156. The court resolved what it considered to be a conflict
in these statutes by holding that IDWR has jurisdiction of water in ihe river
channel until it is delivered to the storage water to the Irrigation Districts
"headgate", but that the Disirict had authority for water distribution from that
point. Id, In sum, the court held the District had discretion to administer water
as between its consumers. R. p. 156-157.
The Mackay Users moved for reconsideration (R. p. 159-161 ), but the
court reconfirmed its prior holding by order dated March 23,2007. R. P. 177183.

The Mackay Users instituted an appeal to this Court. R. p . 186-187. After
they hired new counsel, the parties stipulafed to the dismissal of that appeal
because it was interlocutory and had not been properly certified under I.R.C.P.
54 (b),as the District's claim that it be allowed to implement universal shrink had

not been decided.
After remand, on February 20, 2008, the court entered another Order,
Judgment, and Decree, based on a stipulation of the District and Intervenors
(but not the Mackay Users),requiring that "universal shrink be used to allocate
river losses of storage water among the District consumers. RII. p. 7-13.
The Mackay Users responded with motions to enlarge time and for
reconsideration of each of the court's orders, pointing out that the district court
had not considered several important laws, including: I.C. $42- 801 which
requires IDWR to track storage water put into and taken out of the river on a
person-by-person basis; I.C. 943-1503 which specifies there can b e no conflict in
the law, as ihe court had previously ruled, because the irrigation district laws of
Title 43 (including I.C. 943-304) shall not be construed " . . . as repealing or in any
way modifying the provisions of any other act relating to the subject of irrigation
water or water distribution". 2 Rll. D. 14-21, 145-160.

2

I t is impoi.iaiii to note each of the slatiites inieniioned were iii e f k c t iii siibstaoiially the salnc forb13 belb~ethe I 9 3 6 judicial apportioiimeiil. T h i s
wbeii waici was apyoiiioned in illc reservoir, it was clearly iindcrsiood the conveyance losses woilld be accoiiiiicd for according to ihcse staiiitcs.

On June 8, 2008, the court heard argument on Plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration and the other parties' objections regarding timeliness. It ruled
that it did have discretion to reconsider and denied the timeliness obiections.
Tr. p. 374, In. 20 - p. 375, In. 2. It denied reconsideration because it did not

believe the I936 decree addressed conveyance loss and it believed the
District had the power to change its mind with respect to how shrink was
allocated, even though distribution on a reach basis had occurred for a long
time. Tr. p. 377, In. 6 - p. 379, In. 21
This appeal timely followed that decision
Ill.

Statement of Facts
A.

In 1935 and 1936, an amount of water, measured in the reservoir,
was judicially apportioned to each individual user.

The 1936 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law provide the following:
The Findings state:

... in order to prevent an inequitable distribution to the land ... [the
Board] found, determined and declared certain factors and
consideration to be an integral part of said ... apportionment of
benefits and to be basic and binding regulations which would
govern distribution of water ... and this Court does find, determine
and declare as follows:
That the following factors and considerations are hereby found,
determined, and declared to be an integral part of said
apportionment and assessment of benefits, to-wit:-

... this Court does find and determine that certain [lands] require
... a supplemental storage water right ... from the reservoir and
irrigation works proposed to be acquired ... as shown in the
following table:
Supplemental Requirement in Acre Feet Measured in Reservoir

f Decreed
S u p p Priority
iemeniai
Before June, 1884
June, 1884
July, 1884
August, 1884
September, 884
October, 1884
June, I885
After June, 1885
Year 1886
Year 1887
Year I888
Year 1889
Year 1890
Year 1891
Year I892
Year 1893
Year 1894
Year 1895
Year 1896
Year 1897
Year 1898
Year 1899
Year I900 and Subsequent
Years
RII. p. 51.

/

In Acre Feet Measured in Reservoir
/ None

.46
.59
.64
.65
.8 1
1.04
1.17
1.35
1.51
1.54
1.59
1.63
1.63
1.65
1.65
1.68
1.73
1.73
1.76
1.77
1.77
1.79

Thus, it is clear the voters, the Board and the Court ail knew, considered
and decided to address "inequitable distribution" as "an integral pari" of the
decree, and decided, rightly or wrongly, the solution was to apportion and
measure in the reservoir:
[the Big Lost River Irrigation District] ... Board of Directors in order to
prevent an inequitable distribution to the lands within the district of
the supplemental water ... found, determined, and declared
certain factors and considerations to be an integral part of said
assessment and apportionment of benefits and to be basic and
binding regulations which would govern the distribution of water so
acquired. ... and this Court does find, determine and declare as
follows:That ... this Court does find from a study of the records of the flows
of The Big Lost River and its tributaries ... [on an average year the
reservoir yields storage not of less than] 24,500 acre feet storage
measured in said reservoir, and that those lands within said district
to which have been apportioned certain benefits designated
"Amount Storage Water Assessmeni" are benefited by the
allotment of storage water ...

It is hereby further found and determined by this Court that storage
water is hereby allotted to those lands against which "Storage
Water Assessment" benefits have been apportioned according to
said list and apportionment of benefits, and only such lands shall
be entitled to storage water.
RII. p. 51-52.

And in any year when the water supply belonging to the district
and available for storage shall be more or less than the 24,500
acre feet, then the respective landowners entitled to storage

water shail be entitled to the available stored waters on the same
basis and in the same proportion as shown to be a supplemental
requirement in acre feet for the several ciasses of land according
to the above table.
Later in the conclusions (Rll. p. 65-68) [Exhibit A, XI, pp. 36,39), the court
concluded that the petitioners were entitled to a judgment and decree of the
court ratifying and approving and confirming the proceedings taken by the
Board and:

... ali proceedings in co~iriectionwith the assessment and
apportionment of benefits by reason of carrying out of such plan ...
a copy of the list of said assessment and apportioriment of benefits
being on file herein marked "Petitioners' Exhibit 1 3 .
in the last paragraph of the Fndings and Conclusions, any doubt about the
finality of the proceedings is extinguished by the court's determination:

. . . and all proceedings had and taken by said District as set forth
and described in petitioners' petition on file herein, as legal, valid
and binding upon said District and upon all the lands included
therein and affected thereby. ... Let judgment and decree be
entered accordingly. Dated this 25th day of January, 1936.
RII. p. 69. (Exhibit A, p. 40)

Those findings and conclusions resulted in Exhibit B, the Judgment and
Decree of the same date. Rll. p. 70-84.It confirms the apportionment to each
consumer. it, in Section Vl (page lo), acknowledged the prior proceedings,
the apportionments of benefits, and assessments and notes that they were all

duly accomplished "in the proper manner and order and in full and strict
compliance with the statutes and laws of the State of Idaho applicable
thereto, they are hereby ratified, approved and confirmed." Rll. p. 79-80.
In Section IX (page 11-12), the court determined that the respective
amounts of apportionment for the various tracts and subdivisions of lands,
including the special factors and considerations entering into the
apportionment and the basic rules and regulations governing the use and
distribution of water upon those lands, are "hereby ratified, approved and
confirmed." Rll. p. 81.
And in the final section, Section Xlll (p. 13),the court adjudicates each
and every act in the proceedings with respect to the things described in
Petitioners' Petition to be lawfully and properly accomplished, and to be "valid
and binding upon said District and all lands included therein and affected
thereby; and each and every of the said acts and proceedings are hereby
ratified, approved and confirmed". Rll. p. 83

B.

In 1994, through a process of negotiated rulemaking in which the
District participated, IDWR adopted a Rule for administering water
that required water losses in the river channel below the Mackay
Dam be accounted for on a reach-by-reach basis and rejected
the concept of "universal shrink.

During the early stages of the Snake River Basin Adjudication, the Big Lost
River Valley was selected as one of the "test basins" because significant issues

had arisen concerning water rights and how to administer the reservoir. R. p

142. Consequently, pursuant to the SRBA Court orders an interim administration,
David Shaw, Bureau Chief for IDWR, implemented negotiated rulemaking
which the District attended and participated in. Id. Rule 40.03.b (IDAPA
37.03.12.40.03.b). Id. The Rule was adopted to preserve what the participants
all considered the equitable distribution of storage water in Water District 34
This was done in part to specifically address the concerns of individual water
right holders about how delivery losses would be applied to storage water. Id.
It was intended to insure the storage water would not be subject to universal
shrink, but would be allocated on the shrink-by-reach formula set forth in the
Rule. id.
The final Rule reads as follows:
Conveyance losses in the natural channel shall be proportioned by
the watermaster between natural flow and impounded water. The
proportioning shall be done on a river reach basis. Impounded
water flowing through a river.reach that does not have a
conveyance loss will not be assessed a loss for that reach. The
impounded water flowing through any river reach that does have
a conveyance loss will be assessed and a proportionate share of
the loss for each losing reach through which the impounded river
flows. To avoid an iterative accounting procedure, impounded
water conveyance loss from the previous day shall be assessed on
the current day.
This Rule, which is consistent with the 1936 decree and the admitted

historic practice effectively resolved the disputes until the District made another
attempt at implementing universal shrink in 2005.
C.

The Big Lost River Irrigation District adopted bylaws and policies, as
late as 2004, confirming each individual user has the right to
apportioned water under the 1936 decree.

The current version of the District's own Bylaws provides as follows:
Sec. 5. Any water consumer who has any water right under the
Assessment and Apportionment of Benefits under the District's bond
issue voted May 18, 1935, and approved and confirmed by the
District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in
and for the County of Custer, on January 6, 1936, and thereafter
approved by Reconstruction Finance Corporation, shall have the
right to any water belonging to him by such storage right or direct
flow under said Assessment and Apportionment of Benefits, in the
District's Reservoir, [but such water consumer shall be required first
io give forty-eight (48) hours notice to the general manager of the
district or to the office of the district of his intention to store said
water, and such water consumer shall likewise give forty-eight (48)
hours notice to the general manager or to the office of the district
of his desire again to use water]. (This paragraph was deleted
from bylaws June 2, 1964.) (Emphasis added.)

Sec. 7. The Board of Directors shall have power to reduce the
quantity of storage water demanded by any consumer in case of
a shortage in the Mackay Reservoir, or by reason of breakage in
the banks of canals, headgates or dams, whereupon it shall be the
duty of the Board of Directors to apportion the water available pro
rata among all consumers.

Rll. p. 99. (Exhibit C, Article Vll, p.12.)

The District has argued that the first paragraph above was deleted, but
Appellants maintain only the bracketed portion was, as is consistent with all of
the other deletions through the Bylaws

D.

"Universal shrink, the central issue in this case, is an accounting
method that effectively reapportions water to annul the amount
judicially apportioned to each individual user.

There is no dispute about what "universal shrink is. But for the sake of
clarity it is important that the Court understand not only what it is, but what it is
not. First, universal shrink only applies to water being transported from the
reservoir through the naiural river channel of the Big Lost River. Once judicially
apportioned storage water is diverted from the natural river channel into
canals and ditches, it falls outside the universal shrink scheme. The District
admits that, once water is diverted into a canal, conveyance losses from the
canal are charged only to those who use water from the canal
Second, it is important to understand that the universal shrink scheme
applies only to the apportioned storage water. Those who have water rights
diverted directly from the river, and not through storage, are not charged a
conveyance loss in the channel below the reservoir. This is obviously because
they are entitled to have their water diverted from the river at their point of
diversion, without regard to conveyance losses because such losses do no1

come into play with respect to those natural flow rights until they are diverted
out of the river. Thus, to suggest the river-by-reach formula is designed to apply
to flow rights and not to storage rights ignores the fundamental attributes of the
flow rights. As is argued below, the universal shrink scheme is nothing more
than an attempt to "reapportion" the storage water in a manner inconsistent
with the judicial apportionment in the reservoir.
Finally, it is also undisputed the Mackay Users lose part of their
apportioned water when the universal shrink scheme is implemented, contrary
to their constitutional right to use water that has been dedicated to their land.
See R. p. 87 (Exhibit B to the 2nd amended complaint), showing the actual
shrink under the river-by-reach accounting versus the universal shrink
accounting.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

Did the district court err in holding that the Big Lost River Irrigation
District has unfettered discretion to distribuie apportioned water
below the Mackay Dam without regard to the 1936 judicial
apportionment?

11.

Did the district court further err by judicially decreeing that the
universal shrink scheme, which causes individual users to lose
apportioned water so that other users can benefit, is lawful and to
be applied without reference to limitations in the 1936 decree and
the 1994 Rule?

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Appellants Nelson, et al., request costs and attorney fees on appeal
under I.A.R. 40 and 41 and I.C. 3 12-1 17. The costs should be awarded as a
matter of right under the Appellate Rules. The attorney fees should be
awarded under I.C. $12-117 against the District because it acted without
reasonable basis in fact or law by intentionally and erroneously designing a
scheme to deprive the Mackay Users, people to whom it owes a duty as
trustee, of water judicially apportioned to them and constitutionally protected
through the dedication of that water to their properties.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
in reviewing the summary judgment motions this Court employs the same
standard used by the district court. Sprinkler irrigation Co., lnc. v. John Deere
Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 695, 85 P.3d 667, 671 (2004). Judgment is
appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits and other
materials on file show no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c).

ARGUMENT
The Court erred in holding the District has unfettered discretion to ignore the
previous judicial allocation of benefits, including the apportionment of water.
To properiy analyze the claims in this case, one must first recognize the
legal standards that circumscribe the discretion statutorily allocated to the
courts and to an irrigation district. When dealing with matters of discretion, the
court must decide: ( I ) what legal discretion the district has: (2) whether the
district has acfed within the outer bounds of that discretion and consisieni with
legal standards; and, (3)whether the district's decision to seek and obtain a
judicial decree mandating "universal shrink" falls within the district's discretion
and exercise of reason. See, Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. ldaho Power
Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
In this case, the analysis begins with acknowledgment the District has
some discretion to distribute water pursuant to I.C. 543-304. However,
Appellants contend the District acted beyond the bounds of that discretion by
ignoring the 1936 decree, by attempting to circumvent the conveyance loss
rule, and by failing to exercise a reasonable and equitable distribution plan.
1.

Irrigation District Law limits the District's power by compelling it to abide
by the 1936 decree.
Irrigation districts are creatures of statute. Their quasi-public corporate

status confers on them only such powers as given by statute or necessarily

implied therefrom. Yaden v. Gem lrrigation District, 37 ldaho 300, 21 6 P. 250
(1923). The power of directors and officers is limited by the express and implied
provisions of statutes, and any actions in excess of the statutory provisions are
ultra vires. Lewiston Orchards Irrigation District v. Gilmore, 53 ldaho 377, 23
P.2d 720 ( 1 9331.
To date, neither the lower court nor the parties have considered the
express, statutory limitations that follow from the declaration that the use of
water is a public use to be regulated and controlled in the manner prescribed
by law. Nampa and Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Barclay, 47 P.2d, 91 6, 921 (ldaho,
1935). [The consumers have rights as distributees of the water under Sections 4
and 5, ArI. 15, of the Constituiion.}
Furthermore, to avoid arbitrary or capricious exercise of an irrigation
district's powers under I.C. 843-406, the benefits each landholder will receive,
and the corresponding assessments he will pay, must be fixed by judicial
decree when bonding is approved. I.C. 843-406.
When a district is created and when it uses bonds to acquire its water
rights and works, a court must decide and decree what benefits and what
costs in proportion to those specific benefits will be apportioned equitably to
each of the parcels of land which will receive the water. This process is spelled

out in Title 43, Chapter 4, beginning with the election to authorize issuance of
bonds and the Board initially apportioning costs and benefits. I.C. 343-404. The
Board must then hold hearings i o apportion the benefits to the tracts of land
and determine whether benefits and assessmenis will be just and equitable.
I.C. §43-405. Then, a district court must confirm the assessments and
apportionments are just and equitable. I.C. 943-406.
The decree of confirmation fixes the apportionment and is conclusive as
to all matters considered in the proceedings. American Falis Reservoir District v.
Phraii, 39 Idaho 105, 130, 228 P. 236 (1924). By specific statutory prohibition, any
reopening of the case "shall not be considered as authorizing any rehearing of
the matter theretofore heard and decided". I.C. 943-406.

It is significant to protecting a consumer's rights that a court, and not the
board, is assigned the duty of ratifying, approving and confirming the
assessments, lists, apportionments and distributions. If the court finds any matter
unjust or erroneous, "the same [petition] shall not be returned to said board, but
the court shall proceed to correct the same so as to conform to this title and
the rights of all parties in the premises ... " I.C. 343-408. Under this provision, the
confirming court clearly has the power to make adjustments to any
apportionment of benefits and does not act merely in the capacity of a rubber

stamp. Haga v. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District, 38 ldaho 333, 221 P. 147

(1923). This judicial determination is res judicata and cannot be collaterally
attacked. Knowles v. New Sweden Irrigation Dist., 16 ldaho 21 7, 101 P. 81

( 1 908); Smith v. Progressive Irrigation District, 28 ldaho 81 2, 156 P. 1 133 ( 1 9 16);
see also, Russell v. Irish, 20 ldaho 194, 118 P. 501 (191 1 ) .
In short, from before ldaho became a state until the present, ldaho has
statutorily mandated that a landholder's proportion of benefits and costs be
equitably fixed by a court at ihe time a district is being created or bonds issue.
Furthermore, once fixed by judicial adjudication, a district has no discretion to
change them.
To bond the lands of the settlers within a district to acquire the right to the
use of water and then to deprive them of such right in order that it may be
furnished to lands without the district would clearly be taking property of the
landowners within the district without due process of iaw. Yaden v. Gem
Irrigation District, 37 ldaho 300, 309 (1923). To circumvent the apportionmenl
that was fixed during the 1936 bonding process through universal shrink has the
same affect. It takes an apportionment of water to give it to others within a
district.
In this case, the benefits were adjudicated in 1936 and specifically

apportioned so that each user's benefit would be a volume of water
"measured in the reservoir".
The Findings state:
... in order to prevent an inequitable distribution to the land ... [the
Board] found, determined and declared certain factors and
consideration to be an integral part of said ... apportionment of
benefits and to be basic and binding regulations which would
govern distribution of water ... and this Court does find, determine
and declare as follows:

That the following factors and considerations are hereby found,
determined, and declared to be an integral part of said
apportionment and assessment of benefits, to-wit:... this Court does find and determine that certain [lands] require

... a supplemental storage water right ... from the reservoir and
irrigation works proposed to be acquired ... as shown in the
following table:
Supplemental Requirement in Acre Feet Measured in Reservoir

Decreed Priority
Before June,] 884
June, I884
July, 1884
U u s t , 1884
September, 884
October, 1884
June, 1885
After June, 1885
Year 1886
Year 1887
Year 1888

Supplemental Requirement
In Acre Feet Measured in Reservoir
None
.46
.59
.64
.65
.8 1
1.04
1.17
1.35
1.51
1.54

Year 1889
Year 1890
-Year 1891
Year 1892
Year 1893
Year 1894
Year 1895
Year 1896
Year 1897
Year 1898
Year 1899
/ Year 1900 and Subsequent

/

1.59
1.63
1.63
1.65
1.65
1.68
1.73
1.73
1.76
1.77
1.77
1.79

1

Thus, it is clear that in 1936 the voters, the Board, and the Court all knew,
considered and decided to address "inequitable distribution" as "an integral
part" of the decree, and decided, rightly or wrongly, the solution was to
apportion and measure in the Reservoir. Now the District wants to measure at
the headgates, numerous miles below the Reservoir. They label this "universal
shrink," this scheme of effectively forcing Mackay Users to give water
apportioned to them to the Arco Users for conveyance losses downstream of
the Mackay Users.
The label does not change the fact that universal shrink is ~iotliingmore
than a reapportionment. A reapportionment contrary to the doctrine of res
judicata and the clause in I.C. 943-406 that provides no matter considered in
the initial case apportioning benefits may be reheard. American Falls Reservoir

District v. Thrall, 39 Idaho 130, 228 Pac. 2236 (1924).(The decree that confirms
and fixes the apportionment of benefits is conclusive as to all matters
considered in the proceedings).
Neither the Intervenors, the District, nor the Court, has the power or
discretion to "equitably reapportion."

ii.

The District Court's Summary Judgment Order Fails to Construe the
Statutes in Pari Materia.
The Court may not enter an illegal order, denying Appellants the benefits

previously apportioned to them per court decree. Nor can the lower court's
order withstand scrutiny when all of the pertinent statutes are considered
A.

This lower court's ruling erroneously concludes and effectively
holds the District has ']urisdictionflto reapportion.

The district court has decided, when IDWR promulgated the rules, the
rules were directed to apply only to the watermaster under authority from 1.C
342-603, and not to the District. However, Appellants submit the district court
did not dig deep enough in the statutes when it stated, under I.C. 343-304, the
Board has authority and discretion to allocate water in the river below the dam,
Contrary to this ruling, the statutes specify there can be no "conflict" between
IDWR's jurisdiction to administer by rule and the District's jurisdiction to allocate

water amongst its users under Title 43. The duties over water within the river

channel, or what the rules refer to as "reaches," is assigned to IDWR. I.C. $42801. (A reservoir owner must give IDWR an accounting of the specific amount
being discharged into the river and the persons and ditches to whom it will be
conveyed.)
Furthermore, the function assigned to IDWR does not conflict in any way
with the District's statutory powers. In fact, the statutory scheme states IDWR's
authority to administer the reaches is not in any way diminished by irrigation
district law, i.e., Title 43.
I.C. $43-1503 specifically provides:
None of the provisions of this title [43j shall be construed as
repealing or in anywise modifying the provisions of any other act
relating to the subject of the irrigation or water distribution.
Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to authorize any
person or persons to divert the waters of any river, creek, stream,
canal or ditch from its channel, to the detriment of any person or
persons having any interest in such river, creek, stream, canal or
ditch, or the water therein, unless previous compensation be
ascertained and paid therefor, under the laws of this state
authorizing the taking of private property for public uses.
B.

The Practice Of Universal Shrink Is Contrary To The Apportionment
Of Water, As Measured in The Reservoir, IDWR's Duty to Administer,
and the "River by Reaches" Rule.

Using an example helps to illustrate how the universal shrink concept of
water distribution is contrary to the apportionment of benefits, other laws and
Rule 40. In this example, Mr. Mackay and Mr. Arco are persons owning land to

which the benefits were apportioned, as measured in the reservoir, in 1936. Mr.
Mackay's land is slightly below the reservoir on the first "river reach". Mr. Arco's
land is 20 miles below the reservoir, closer to the town of Arco.
Mr. Mackay and Mr. Arco were each apportioned 10 acre feet, as
measured in the reservoir. When Mr. Mackay's 10 acre feet are delivered, one
acre foot is lost through conveyance in the river below the reservoir. When Mr.
Arco's 10 acre feet are delivered, 5 acre feet are lost in conveyance in the river
below the reservoir.
If universal shrink is applied, Mr. Mackay would not receive 9 acre feet at

his headgate when he calls for his 10 acre feet of water. Instead, if Mr. Arco
and Mr. Mackay are each calling for their 10 acre feet of water, Mr. Mackay
would only realize 7 acre feet instead of 9. (20 acre feet less total conveyance
loss of six acre feet, divided by two equals three acre feet of loss apportioned
to Mr. Mackay).
Such a scheme is contrary to law and takes Mr. Mackay's rights that have
been fixed since 1936, by vote, petition, decree and now IDWR's Rule.

CONCLUSION
This Court must effectuate prior decrees and reject the opponent's
attempts to reapportion rights under some ill-defined notions of equity, called
universal shrink.
In sum, while a district has some discretion to equitably distribute water
among its consumers, the District's discretion is limited to distribution by the
judicially fixed parameters established when the District purchased the system
through bonding. Neither the District nor this Court may ignore those
parameters. In this case, the parameters have been disregarded, both in terms
of IDWR's unitary obligation to control the distribution of water, and in terms of
the legal prohibitions imposed on the District's discretion to change and ignore
the judicial apportionment of benefits to the consumers.
Furthermore, there is no legal split in authority to decide how to account
for water lost in the riverbed. IDWR's authority is not diminished or in conflict
with the District's laws of Title 43. I.C. 343-1503 specifically forbids such a conflict
and legislatively mandates that this Court apply IDWR's Rule to all users of the
river who convey water in it.
The outer boundaries of the District's and this Court's discretion are fixed
by the 1936 decree and statute, and cannot be altered. Under I.C. 543-406 the

allotment of water to each consumer, as measured in the Reservoir, was
permanently established as a benefit to each consumer. As the "trustee" of
these allotments, the District must protect each for the specific consumer, not
dilute them. See, Jensen v. Boise-Kuna Irr. Dist., 75 Idaho 133, 141, 26 P.2d 755,
760 (1954). (Under I.C. $43-316,a district holds the water in trust for its
consumers.)
Therefore, the Court is respectfully requested to reverse the decisions
below to comply with the law, as described above
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